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Introduction 
During the Spring Quarter of 2006, the Department of National Security Affairs of the Naval 
Postgraduate School introduced a new graduate seminar entitled Modeling Terrorism: New 
Analytical Approaches. This course was designed to introduce the seminar students to a variety 
of analytic methods which could be used to organize their thinking about and approach to 
terrorism research. One objective of the course was to introduce the students to heuristics and 
techniques that would allow them to model or simulate terrorist dynamics in any number of virtual 
environments. The course aimed at sharpening the students’ analytic skills and equipping them 
with tools for actionable analysis to commanders and policymakers confronting questions 
concerning terrorism. Substantively, the course focused its attention on the Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat (the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, or GSPC), a 
terrorist organization active in west and north Africa.  
This special edition of Strategic Insights presents four articles that represent products of this 
course and subsequent research. As will be suggested below, these articles explicitly explore 
aspects and dynamics concerning GSPC operations, financing, recruitment, and narratives.[1] 
Before introducing these articles, however, I would first like to introduce the reader to the GSPC 
and set a context for the articles that follow.  
The GSPC organized sometime between 1996 and 1998 as an offshoot of the takfiri group, 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The GSPC was ostensibly organized due to disagreement over the 
targeting of civilians, a widespread GIA tactic the GSPC found unpalatable. Nonetheless, the 
GSPC retained the GIA’s primary objective of overthrowing the government in Algiers and 
installing an Islamist state.[2] While most observers agree the GSPC’s Algerian operations are in 
decline,[3] the group’s leadership vehemently denies this claim.[4] Although the GSPC historically 
confined its operations to Algeria, today the organization appears to be expanding throughout 
North Africa.[5] Additionally, the GSPC has reportedly “taken over the GIA’s external networks 
across Europe.”[6] Evidence also links the GSPC to Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian convicted of 
attempting to attack Los Angeles International Airport in December 1999.[7] The GSPC further 
alarmed observers in September 2003, when the group’s leader declared allegiance to al 
Qaeda.[8] More recently, Canadian authorities dismantled a GSPC cell in Toronto in November 
2005.[9] The increasingly global nature of the GSPC threat makes it an important and timely 
subject for counterterrorism research. 
History of GSPC 
The beginnings of what would eventually become the GSPC date back to the early 1930s with the 
foundation of the Algerian Ulama under French colonial rule. The purpose of the foundation was 
to provide a basic social service structure without any political purpose.[10] During the 1930s, the 
foundation slowly shifted more toward political involvement in its efforts to create political and 
economic equality in the colony. In November 1954, after the Algerian War of Independence, 
members of the association were divided between those who supported an armed struggle 
against the government and those who opposed such an effort. Although the Ulama remained 
non-violent, in 1982 the Algerian Islamic Armed Movement (MAIA) took a more militant approach. 
MAIA called for the establishment of an Islamist state, through violence if necessary, in order to 
resolve economic and social inequities.[11]  
In 1989, Algeria adopted a new constitution that granted Algerians the right to form political 
parties. A group of Islamist Algerians wasted little time in forming the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). 
Eventually, the FIS rejected the idea of democracy and re-focused its agenda on the 
establishment of an Islamic state. After a FIS victory in the 1991 Algerian national elections, the 
National Assembly President resigned and military High Security Council (HCE) assumed power. 
The HCE abolished the electoral process and dissolved the FIS.[12]  
Although the FIS was finished as a political party, after its dissolution elements from the FIS 
reconstituted themselves as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). This group would go on to become 
the most radical and extreme terrorist group in Algeria, engaging in a violent campaign to 
overthrow the secular Algerian government. In doing so, the GIA targeted indiscriminately, 
engaging not only governmental and military targets but also civilians. In 1996 the campaign 
reached its peak. The GIA massacred thousands of Algerian civilians for their suspected support 
of the Algerian regime and opposition to the GIA. Some estimates put the death toll from these 
GIA attacks at nearly 150,000.[13] The GIA’s violence against Algerian civilians eventually led to 
an organizational schism. In 1996, Hassan Hattab (a.k.a., Abu Hamza) split from the GIA and 
formed the GSPC.[14] The group distinguished itself from the GIA by condemning the latter’s 
attacks on Algerian civilians. Accordingly, the GSPC shifted the focus of its operations by limiting 
its targeting to military, police, and other government entities.  
The leadership and size of the GSPC both have fluctuated since its inception. Hattab resigned as 
the leader of the GSPC in 2001 due to an ideological disagreement among the Islamists. The 
organization’s current leader, Abd al-Malik Druqdal (a.k.a., Abu Musab Abd al-Wadud) is still at 
odds with Hattab, even issuing a fatwa against Hattab on 9 February 2005. As for organizational 
strength, the GSPC initially comprised approximately 700 fighters. Membership grew to as high 
as 4000 around the 2002 timeframe.[15] Experts estimate the organization’s present day strength 
at somewhere between 300 and 500 fighters.[16]  
These extreme fluctuations in GSPC strength are the result of not only from operational attrition, 
but also liberal government amnesty programs. In September 2000, a national referendum 
approved the Civil Concord amnesty for those opposed the government during the 1990s.[17] In 
September 2005, another referendum approved the Charter for Peace and National 
Reconciliation amnesty, targeting Islamist forces. Additionally, this program exempted security 
forces from prosecution for crimes committed in the 1990s and compensated victims of violence 
and the families of the disappeared.[18]  
Social and Economic Context 
Social and economic factors have also had a significant impact on the support base for Algerian 
terrorist groups, affecting their ability to recruit and conduct operations. Throughout the 1990s 
Algeria suffered from a host of problems, including high unemployment and underemployment; 
inadequate housing, health services, and education; eroding infrastructure; inequality of income 
distribution; and government corruption. Today, the government is attempted to address these 
endemic issues with some success. A plan is currently in place to spend $60 billion from 2005-
2009 on infrastructure, housing, and social projects.[19] Nonetheless, the government has its 
work cut out for it. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook 2005, 
Algerian gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is $7,200. Furthermore, although 
unemployment in Algeria has declining recently as a result of high oil prices, the unemployment 
rate is still 22.5 percent.[20] In 2005, a United Nations Human Development Report ranked 
Algeria 103 out of 177 for health, education, and standard of living.[21]  
Hydrocarbons drive the Algerian economy, providing 60 percent of budget revenue and 
accounting for 30 percent of the GDP. Algeria has the fifth largest natural gas reserves in the 
world and ranks second among gas exporting nations. Recent high oil prices have boosted 
economic growth, reduced the unemployment rate, and allowed Algeria to repay some of its 
foreign debt. Economic growth is expected to continue as the government plans to increase crude 
oil output from 1.5 million to 2 million barrels per day by 2010.[22]  
Despite the socioeconomic challenges facing Algeria, domestic support for the GSPC is currently 
low. This lack of support stems from the GSPC’s reversion to violence against the civilian 
populace. The organization targets civilians for two reasons. First, the GSPC will often force 
civilians to listen to their Islamist rhetoric as a crude attempt to spread their ideology. Second, the 
organization targets civilians with the objective of acquiring resources. Inexplicably, the GSPC 
sometime combines these two objectives during one attack. For example, in May 2006 GSPC 
members raided a café in town of Ouled Rabah. “Once surrounded, the customers were forced to 
listen to a bloodthirsty sermon” before the terrorists “ordered the targeted people to pay them 
major sums of money.”[23]  
GSPC Structure and Operations 
The GSPC structure consists of nine zones. A GSPC-appointed emir is in charge of each 
zone.[24] The two most critical zones are the First Region, which borders Algiers to the east, and 
the Ninth Region, which consists of most of the southwestern portion of Algeria. Mokhtar 
Belmokhtar operates in this region, facilitating smuggling operations for drugs, arms and 
cigarettes.[25] Other elements of the GSPC are organized along functional lines. For example, 
Sakir Adil performed websites services for the GSPC while living in Syria. One other significant 
functional task is facilitating GSPC support for insurgent operations in Iraq. To carry out these 
duties, the GSPC recently formed a subgroup called the Organization of al Qaeda in the Land of 
Berbers.[26]  
The operational scope of the GSPC extends beyond the borders of Algeria. Evidence suggests 
that the GSPC has formed relatively self contained cells through Europe in France, Italy, Spain, 
and Britain.[27] Of these countries, Italy and Spain suffer the highest levels of GSPC activity. 
Some experts assess that Italy has become a forward logistical base for operational activities 
throughout Europe.[28] European GSPC cells collaborate on logistical issues, weapons 
procurement, communications, and propaganda. For example, Italian counter-terrorism 
investigations reveal GSPC members in Italy were producing false documentation to enable 
travel to France, Norway, and other northern European Countries.[29] The group has declared 
France its primary European target.[30]  
Evidence also suggests the existence of a network of GSPC funding sources throughout Europe. 
Spanish authorities arrested several GSPC operatives suspected of funneling crime money to 
back to Algeria and to other locations abroad. Algerians suspected of having ties to GSPC are 
routinely arrested across Europe for illegal fundraising activities and plotting operations against 
European governments.[31]  
London-based Algerian Haydar Abd Doha was instrumental in the formation of GSPC cells 
throughout Europe. The Afghan-trained Doha was one of the first to push for the GSPC split from 
the GIA. He refocused the organizations recruitment efforts on the disenfranchised Algerian youth 
resident in various European cities.[32] Doha collaborated with Algerian leaders in Germany and 
Italy to recruit radical militants left behind from previous conflicts such as Bosnia, Chechnya, and 
Afghanistan. He also worked to enable the GSPC’s takeover of pre-existing GIA networks across 
Europe and North Africa in the late 1990s.[33]  
Despite its sprawling European infrastructure, evidence of ties between GSPC and al Qaeda are 
tenuous at best. In addition to ideological similarities between the groups, numerous sources 
connect the GSPC with al Qaeda through GIA participation in Afghan training camps during the 
1990s. Others assert that the GSPC’s shift away from brutal attacks on fellow Muslims attracted 
the financial and logistical support of al Qaeda.[34] Some even claim the GSPC was formed by 
Osama Bin Laden himself. French intelligence and the U.S. State Department sources have 
indicated close cooperation between the two groups.[35] Close to half of the Islamic extremists 
arrested in Europe who claim ties to al Qaeda have been associated with the GSPC.[36] 
Furthermore, in September 2003 the GSPC announced its support for al Qaeda, claiming it was 
now under the direction of Mullah Omar.[37]  
While some evidence supporting GSPC ties to al Qaeda does exist, an interview with former 
GSPC leader Hattab paints a different picture. Hattab refers to Bin Laden’s influence as a source 
of contention within the GSPC. He accuses bin Laden of post-dating his involvement in the GSPC. 
The al Qaeda leader has demonstrated an affinity toward claiming affiliation with movements 
around the world, particularly after a successful attack.[38] Given Hattab’s perspective, GSPC 
allegiance to al Qaeda may simply be an effort by the GSPC to open the door to additional 
funding and resources.  
Still, some conclude that the GSPC’s allegiance and ties to al Qaeda indicate the organization is 
“de-nationalizing” and shifting to international Islamic terrorism. Several sources indicate the 
GSPC is providing support to the insurgency in Iraq. This support began with ideological and 
propaganda messages posted on the GSPC website expressing strong sympathy for the Iraqi 
cause, including a call for Algerians to travel to Iraq and join the insurgency.[39] The GSPC has 
facilitated the movement of Algerians to Iraq to join the insurgency. While it is possible that these 
Algerians are traveling to Iraq in hopes of obtaining valuable training with the intent to return to 
Algeria, most of them are being used as suicide bombers.[40] 
Volume Contents 
The first article of this volume of Strategic Insights authored by Maj Cliff Gyves and Maj Chris 
Wyckoff titled “Algerian Group Salafiste de la Predication et le Combat (Salafi Group for Call and 
Combat, GSPC): An Operational Analysis” represents a detailed analysis of GSPC operations 
based on open source data systematically gathered from a variety of sources. Over 2,400 articles 
on the GSPC were identified and from these articles 405 events attributable to GSPC or affiliates 
were coded representing a timeframe beginning January 1, 1996 to the present. Data were 
gathered on GSPC operational details such as date, tactic, target, harm/resource, geo coordinate, 
and source. Hence both temporal and well as spatial considerations of GSPC operations could be 
systematically analyzed. While the veracity of the data may be questioned, it is assumed that 
biases in the data are randomly distributed and should not have a significant impact on the trends 
of these data. The research presented in this article subjects these data to a variety of descriptive 
statistics in order to clearly and systematically define characteristics of the GSPC in an attempt to 
“know thy enemy.” Beginning in 2005 GSPC called for attacks on French and U.S. interests 
outside of Algeria. This research also explores the analysis of a number of hypotheses 
concerning GSPC operations and the examinations GSPC behavioral trends and vulnerabilities 
are assumed to have policy and tactical relevance to counterterrorist strategies.  
The second article authored by Maj Alex Grynkewich and Maj Chris Reifel, “Modeling Jihad: A 
System Dynamics Model of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat Financial Subsystem,” 
presents a system dynamics simulation model of the GPSC’s financial subsystem. Using a 
political economy framework to model the GSPC financial subsystem, this model is used by 
Grynkewich and Reifel to innovatively address the feedback between GSPC finances and the 
mode and method of the group’s operations. The particular focus of this article is the use of a 
simulation of the GSPC financial subsystem to identify key vulnerabilities within the terrorist 
organization created by potentially conflicting preferences within the terrorist organization. As 
such, the model enables a fuller understanding of the GSPC by answering questions concerning 
how funding affects the quantity and type of GSPC operations, how the financial and operational 
aspects of the organization change over its life cycle (from gestation, to growth, to maturation, 
and decline or death), and what policymakers should expect next from the GSPC. Finally, the 
model enables exploratory analysis of different counter-terrorism financing (CTF) policy options. 
As a non-linear cognitive tool, the model allows for the full range of effects from different policy 
choices, not only the effects they intended. The article concludes with an interesting discussion of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the analytic approach chosen to assess the GSPC financial 
system.  
Keely Fahoum and LT Jonathan Width’s “Marketing Terror: Effects of Anti-Messaging on GSPC 
Recruitment,” presents research concerning GSPC recruitment efforts. This article explores the 
social mobilization of the GSPC (framing strategies in particular), as well as the group’s 
psychology of advertising and marketing and terrorist recruitment. The article also assesses 
GSPC recruitment strategies and an assessment of the targeting used by the group to acquire 
committed joiners. The article next presents a discussion of an agent based model of an artificial 
population programmed with certain levels of receptivity based on perceptions of legitimacy for 
given governments (Algeria and France respectively). This model, in the form of a pseudo-
environment, is used to assess the impact of inputs representing narratives and counter-
narratives on artificial population, in part, to assess the impact of messaging by GSPC recruiters 
and anti-messaging used by Algeria and France. The article concludes with a series of 
recommendations emanating from the research.  
The final article of this special edition of Strategic Insights by Maj Tara A. Leweling and CDR Otto 
Seiber, “Calibrating a Field-level, Systems Dynamics Model of Terrorism’s Human Capital 
Subsystem: GSPC as Case Study” represents a heuristic inquiry in the form of a systems 
dynamics model for describing the flow of persons through the terrorism field. Systems dynamics 
is emerging as an important tool for field-level inquiry into terrorism. Using data coded from news 
reports, Leweling and Seiber demonstrate how a systems dynamics model of terrorism’s human 
capital subsystem can be calibrated to a specific terrorist organization. The article also 
demonstrates how the model might be extended to explore two variables associated with the 
decline of terrorist groups: 1) the presence of an amnesty program and 2) enhanced information 
sharing agreements with a foreign country. The systematic calibration of the model suggests that 
misattributing causal explanations to flows within terrorism’s human capital subsystem has 
deleterious effects on model integrity. The article concludes that counterterrorism analysts would 
be well served to be circumspect and highly parsimonious when adding causal factors into their 
conceptual and computational models of terrorism, or when such circumspection is not possible, 
to subject their models to aggressive and systematic empirical testing. Leweling and Seiber 
introduce a rudimentary Recruitment Estimate Technique (RET) to assist with model calibration 
that may be of use to other researchers.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email ccc@nps.edu 
with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be used for no other 
purpose. 
References 
1. The articles of this special edition of Strategic Insights are the sole responsibility of the authors 
and should not be construed as an official position or policy of the Naval Postgraduate School or 
Department of Defense.  
2. Sara Daly, “The Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat: A Dossier,” Terrorism Monitor 3, 
No. 5 (March 11, 2005), 6. 
3. Stephen Ulph, “Disarray in the Algerian GSPC,” Terrorism Focus 1, No. 7, October 29, 2004; 
Stephen Ulph, “Schism and Collapse of Morale in Algeria’s GSPC,” Terrorism Focus 2, No. 7, 
March 31, 2005. 
4. Evan Kohlman, “Interview with Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, Commander of the Algerian Salafist 
Group for Prayer and Combat (GSPC),” GlobalTerrorAlert.com, September 26, 2005. 
5. Emily Hunt, “Al-Qaeda’s North Africa Franchise: The GSPC Regional Threat,” The Washington 
Institute Policy Watch #1034, September 28, 2005. 
6. Anthony Keats, “In the Spotlight: The Salafist Group for Call and Combat,” Center for Defense 
Information. 
7. Ibid.  
8. Daly, Op. Cit., 8.  
9. Stephen Ulph, “Declining in Algeria, GSPC Enters International Theater,” Terrorism Focus 3, 
No. 1 (January 9, 2006), 2. 
10. Colonel Rachid Zouine (Algerian Army), “Islamism and Terrorism in Algeria,” U.S. Army War 
College report, April 9, 2002, 1.  
11. Ibid., 2-4.  
12. Ibid., 4.  
13. Jonathan Schanzer, “Algeria’s GSPC and America’s ‘War on Terror’,” The Washington 
Institute, October 15, 2002. 
14. Ibid.  
15. Stephen Ulph, “GSPC Rival Leader Hattab Reclaims Title,” Terrorism Focus 2, No. 21, 
November 14, 2005. 
16. Emily Hunt, Op. Cit.  
17. Carol Migdalovitz, “Algeria: Current Issues,” CRS Report RS21532 (Washington, D.C: Library 
of Congress, Congressional Research Service), April 24, 2006, 3.  
18. Ibid.  
19. Ibid., 4.  
20. Ibid.  
21. United Nations Human Development Program, 2005 Human Development Report. 
22. Ibid., 4.  
23. Salim Haddou, “Algerian Terrorists Shake Down Ouled Aissa Village Residents,” Tizi Ouzou 
La Depeche de Kabylie, Internet Version: FBIS report GMP20060503380004, May 3, 2006. 
24. Emily Hunt, “Terrorism and Insurgency: Counter-terrorism successes force Algerian militants 
to evolve,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 1, 2006. 
25. Daly, Op. Cit., 6.  
26. The Jamestown Foundation “Al Qaeda in Iraq Endorses their Cohorts in Algeria,” Terrorism 
Focus 2, No. 12 (June 24, 2005). 
27. Carol Migdalovitz, Op. Cit., 2  
28. Kathryn Haahr-escolano, “GSPC in Italy: The Forward Base of Jihad in Europe,” Terrorism 
Monitor 4, No. 3 (February 9, 2006), 3. 
29. Ibid., 3.  
30. Ibid., 2.  
31. Ibid.  
32. Anthony Keats, “In the Spotlight: The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC),” CDI 
Terrorism Project, January 14, 2003, 1. 
33. Ibid.  
34. Schanzer, “Algeria’s GSPC and America’s ‘War on Terror’,” Op. Cit., 2.  
35. Ibid.  
36. Schanzer, Al Qaeda’s Armies, Op. Cit., 101.  
37. Daly, Op. Cit., 3  
38. Ulph, Op. Cit., 2.  
39. Hunt, “Al-Qaeda’s North African Franchise: The GSPC Regional Threat,” Op. Cit., 3.  
40. Ibid. Estimates place the percentage suicide bombings performed by Algerians as high as 20 
percent.  
CCC Home Naval Postgraduate School 
 
